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disobedience in a theatre play
Abstract
Despite its ancient origin Sophocles’ Antigone has proven to be timeless and provided continued
inspiration for legal scholars, theatre practitioners and theorists alike. In this article I reflect on how the
figure of Antigone continues to inspire contemporary play writing preoccupied with the intersections of
law and theatre. The article analyses the play of my authorship, ‘Trumpsformation’ using the notion of
‘contemporary Antigones’. I argue that while Antigone has been often seen as a specific type of a female
character, sometimes even a disturbed one, in my understanding a variety of characters can take on a role
of an Antigone. This is possible, because Antigone’s political power lies in her role as a dissident who
challenges injustices perpetuated in the name of the law. In this article I show how the presence of the
figure of a contemporary Antigone and the use of an Antigonean conflict can be incorporated in the
process of staging contemporary stories about injustice, law and the ethical duty in the times of conflict
over the shape of political community.
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Antigones of contemporary theatre:
capturing problems of today’s civil
disobedience in a theatre play
Dorota Anna Gozdecka1
1 Introduction
No other theatrical play has attracted as much attention from legal
scholars and philosophers as Sophocles’ Antigone. Analysed extensively
since Hegel (1979, 1896) the play has been interpreted through a
variety of prisms (Butler 2002, Hirvonen 2000, Honig 2013, van den
Berge 2017, Etxabe 2009) that have revealed diverse interpretations
of the relationship between law and justice. Despite its ancient origin
the play has proven to be timeless and provides continued inspiration
for legal scholars, theatre practitioners and theorists alike. In my
capacity as a legal scholar, a playwright and a theatre practitioner,
Antigone has served as a rich source of inspiration and a ground for
reflection on more contemporary problems related to the troubled
liaison between law and justice. In this article, I would like to reflect
on how Antigonean conflict inspired writing my own contemporary
law and theatre play dealing with the notions of law and justice in the
times of increased conflict over identity and belonging. I will do so by
reference to the play of my authorship, Trumpsformation, which was
staged at Canberra’s Ainslie and Gorman Arts Centre in March 2018
by the Antigone Law and Theatre Group at the Australian National
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University College of Law under my directorship. This article serves
as a theoretical commentary on the purpose of the play and the acts
of civil disobedience depicted in the play. In my analysis of the play
and its relationship to the contemporary conundrums related to the
intersections of law and justice, I will use the notion of ‘contemporary
Antigones’. I will argue that while Antigone has been seen by some as
a specific type of a female character (Mills 1986), sometimes even a
disturbed one (van den Berge 2017), multiple theatrical characters can
in fact take on a role of Antigone in uncovering the inner relationship
between law and justice. This is possible thanks to the presence of an
Antigonean conflict, which following Etxabe (2011), I see as a situation
reflecting incommensurability – an intersection where law and justice
speak two different languages that are impossible to reconcile. This
incommensurability results in tragic outcomes for the dramatis personae.
Thanks to the presence of this conflict, multiple plays, beyond Antigone
itself, can be identified as reflective of the law-justice junction. While
the plot of Trumpsformation itself was inspired by Ionesco’s Rhinoceros
rather than Sophocles’ Antigone, it was critically focused on the presence
of the Antigonean conflict and the incommensurability between the
call of justice and the call of the law. In this article, I will illustrate the
importance of this incommensurability by first focusing on the notion
of the Antigonean conflict and second analysing what this conflict
tells us about the relationship between law, justice and the dissident.
I will then illustrate how these notions are important for identifying
contemporary Antigones – tragic characters that serve as a theatrical
prism for expounding the troubled alliance between law, justice and
the call of duty. Finally, I will explain how Trumpsformation uses these
notions to tell a story about injustice, law and incommensurability. I
will focus on the growing chasm between the legal and the ethical duty
in the times of the conflict over the notion of belonging and the shape
of political community.
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2 The Antigonean conflict
Many writers on Antigone have seen Antigone as an archetypal
character highlighting certain social roles. For instance, Hegel’s famous
analysis of the play focused on the relationship between the family
and the polis captured through the figure of Antigone (Mills 1986).
According to Mills, Hegel saw Antigone primarily as a young woman
and her protest against Creon’s rules banning the burial of her brother
Polyneices as an example of the conflict between the private and the
public domain (1986: 133-134). Hegel’s emphasis on the familial duties
that Antigone speaks to confines her in the rather narrow category of
a typical pagan female of her time (ibid). Yet, Mills reminds us that in
that categorisation Hegel forgets something crucial:
If we accept Hegel’s interpretation of pagan life as a tragic conflict
between the familial particular and the political universal which cannot
be overcome in life, then Antigone’s decision to commit suicide, which
Hegel does not discuss, is of paramount importance. That is, unlike the
male, Antigone cannot live out the contradiction of pagan life. Man is
able to endure the duality of pagan life through his relation to woman
as wife – she maintains the family as the sphere of his particularity
while he acts in the polis, the sphere of universality. But woman’s
relation to man does not offer her a way to make this duality tolerable.
His desire for her is such that she is never a particular self in relation
to him nor does she experience the universality of the polis through
him. And when woman as sister leaves the family to experience the
universality of the polis and to achieve particularity there is no relation
to man that can sustain her. Thus, while man lives the tragic conflict
of pagan life, woman dies from it (1986: 143).

Having in mind this tragic consequence of the conflict between the
universal and the particular for a woman, it is no wonder that others,
like Butler (2000), have argued that Antigone is not just a tragic
female of her time but rather an archetype of a feminist character.
Butler challenges Hegel’s interpretation that confines Antigone in
a stereotypical feminine role and sees her rather as none else but
a challenger of that role. Antigone’s feminist stance is expressed
primarily in her challenge to the presumption that the familial and
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the political constitute two separate domains (Butler 2000: 35-36) and
her rebellion against any predefined expectations of womanhood. She
does so by firstly refusing to obey the law that fails to recognise the
loss of her brother (Butler 2000: 24) thus making the private political,
and secondly by refusing to perform the role of a ‘woman’ prescribed to
her by the traditions and norms. As Butler observes, Antigone defies
traditional expectations of what it means to be a woman in a familial
relationship and challenges the very image of what familial kinship
ought to entail for a woman. She is unmarried and childless and chooses
the pain of death to bury her brother – the action that she sees as an
ethical necessity, but which forfeits the possibility of marriage and
motherhood and prioritises the fraternal ethical duty over all else. In
Butler’s words, ’it is no doubt important, on the one hand, to refuse
her conclusion that to be without a child is itself a tragic fate, and, on
the other hand, to refuse the conclusion that the incest taboo must be
undone in order for love to freely flourish everywhere’ (ibid). Antigone
is thus not a one-sided but instead a multisided and complex character
that is difficult to grasp for anyone looking for a single archetype.
She defies so many expectations and challenges so many assumptions
that she serves as a poor example of an archetypal young woman,
speaker for the family, typical pagan of her time or the advocate for
the presence of the private domain in public considerations. In fact, so
many issues are touched by Antigone’s dirge that Honig sees her simply
as a tragic humanist character. Honig observes at least three primary
areas where Antigone’s plea is important: the politics of lamentation,
tensions between natal and conjugal family loyalties, and highlighting
Creon’s failure to meet the standard of governance (2009: 16). Honig
argues that Antigone is simply a character paradigmatic of agonistic
humanism that promotes politics of struggle, pain, and conflict but
also of mutuality, pleasure, and care (2009: 26). Yet in her arrival to
this conclusion Honig multiple times points to the political nature of
Antigone’s stance, saying that ‘Antigone’s dirge is both an integral part
of her intervention into fifth-century politics, and also a still powerful
solicitation to contemporary audiences to see grief and lamentation in
political not ethical terms’ (2009: 10). I would like to argue that it is
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this political potential of Antigone’s conflict with Creon that ought
to be emphasised and that guarantees the play’s universality despite
changing social contexts and understanding of the family. I disagree
with authors such as van den Berge who claim that ‘Antigone expresses
her extreme and unreflected loyalty to her family above anything else’
(2017: 216). In line with Honig, I see Antigone’s stance not as much
as a personal struggle for the family, as van den Berge or Hegel would
see it, but rather as a distinctly political protest against the failure of the
standard of governance expressed in existing laws. What stands behind
Antigone’s plea is the conflict of the ethical and legal and the stance
against drastic failures of the law to recognise ethically just solutions.
As someone speaking against the injustice of the law, she is more an
archetype (if we can speak of one at all) of a dissident or a protester
than an irrational speaker for her own relatives. Tiefenbrun insists
that Antigone is ‘one of the first great heroines of civil disobedience
and the inspiration of resistance movements against tyranny’ (1999:
35). Tiefenbrun argues further that the true nature of Antigonean
conflict is the conflict between positivism and the protest against
unjust law. While the author reminds us that not all disobedience of
the law is a civil disobedience, Antigone’s protest is, because it is nonviolent, open and visible, illegal and performed for a moral purpose
of protesting against unjust law or status quo with an expectation
of punishment (Tiefenbrun 1999: 41). Tiefenbrun believes that the
by-product of Antigone’s protest is a law reform – the motivation of
any true civil disobedience movement. I concur with Tiefenbrun that
Antigone speaks to the desire of challenging unjust law – the true
reason behind Antigone’s instance on the importance of her duties
towards her family. It is not just a personal stance but also a serious
political challenge to the legal system. This desire of challenging unjust
law lies at the heart of any Antigonean conflict and is born out of
incommensurability between the call of the law and the call of justice
(Etxabe 2011). Using Lyotard’s differend and Ranciere’s disagreement,
Etxabe argues that Antigonean conflict is an encapsulation of the
idea of incommensurability. He understands the term as broader than
merely the lack of a common communication platform for both sides
208
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of the argument, like in a differend, or the lack of the common premise
between the two parties of the argument, as in a disagreement. Instead,
he insists that in Antigone:
the audience is confronted with an incommensurability of judgment,
for she is in the position of judging a conf lict between two
incommensurable parties, each of which is right in its own terms. This
is not to claim a false equivalency between the two parties, for there
are clear inequalities in the positions of Antigone and Creon. The
two are equal only as parties of a conflict that is made possible only
in Sophocles’ text and by the audience trying to comprehend it. To
become a reader, that is, to adopt the position (and the responsibilities)
of a reader, compels her to act as if she were committed to both, that
is, to comprehend and to be just to both. Paradoxically, the more one
tries to comprehend each party, the more one is distanced from the
other; the more one penetrates the conflict, the more one realizes the
severity and depth of it (Etxabe 2011: 76).

As Etxabe points out, Antigonean conf lict and its tragic
incommensurability is characterised not only by a deep rift between
both parties but also inequalities between both. He further points out
that Antigone’s position would not be heard in the court of law due to
none else but this inherent inequality between both parties – the law
vis-à-vis the dissident. Thus, relying solely on hearing the arguments
of the law risks ‘remaining deaf to the kind of wrongs, injustices,
and inequalities that cannot be properly articulated in the current
state of affairs, the staging of the incommensurability requires the
vigilant and timely intervention of an audience that will recognize the
incommensurability’ (Etxabe 2011: 77). In his further exploration of
incommensurability, Etxabe follows one of the two paths he maps out –
the situation of a third person that must adjudicate an incommensurable
conflict between two parties. I follow the other one he outlines, but
does not engage with – the case of an individual who faces a tragic
choice between incommensurable options and remains faithful to the
perceived supremacy of their own normative perception of justice.
Following Tiefenbrun and building on Etxabe, I argue that the
premise of the Antigonean conflict is not as much preoccupation with
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particularities of the conflicts between public-private, male-female or
religion-law, but conflict between the law and the power to enact laws
and the dissident. The incommensurability of the positions between
the two is encapsulated in the presumption of legality of enacted laws
and the belief that such laws are normatively unjust and thus fail
to provide an adequate standard of justice. I would thus argue that
Antigonean conflict is a conflict between the legal and the ethical in
which injustice becomes illuminated in an incommensurable exchange
of arguments between the dissident and power capable of enacting
legally valid laws; an exchange that would not become visible if not for
the dissident’s action, whether purely verbal or not. Below I will focus
more on whether each act of dissent is an instance of an Antigonean
conflict or whether there are conditions that make some forms of dissent
more justifiable than others.
3 Dissent, Antigonean conflict and injustice of the law
If we accept that Antigone encapsulates a conflict between the existing
laws and the power to enact and execute laws and the dissident, the
next question that arises is who a dissident is and whether all conflicts
between the power and the dissident are by nature Antigonean conflicts.
As pointed out above (Tiefenbrun 1999) not all conflicts between the
dissident and power are likely be Antigonean. I argue that Antigonean
conflicts are essentially moral conflicts facing a dissident, which she
is unable to resolve using the legal confines of a system. It is in fact
incredibly difficult to outline which acts of such dissent are ‘justifiable’
and Antigonean and which are born out of other motives. Singer
observed a fundamental difference between dissent for the purposes
of gaining power or advantage and dissent against exclusion from
power (1974: 36). For Singer dissent is not justifiable simply on the
grounds of disliking rules and wishing to have greater power on how
they are shaped (1974: 37). Such dissent would lead to the breakdown
of rules and processes (ibid). Instead justifiable dissent needs to have
a morally justifiable cause, like unfairness or exclusion from creating
the rules, such as for instance exclusion of minorities (Singer 1974:
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42-45). While such dissent does not always guarantee justifiable claim,
Singer suggests that to recognise dissent as legitimate ‘the unfairness
in the operation of the system must be ‘unmistakably clear’ (or some
similar requirement)’ (1974: 45). In liberal theory, such requirement
is seen as an opposition to infringement of equal rights and liberties
(Rawls 1993, Cohen and Arato 1992 cited in Smith 2013: 38). For
Rawls (1993), such an opposition is a conflict of duty between obeying
the law and the fight for fairness. Rawls, not dissimilarly to Singer,
sees dissent as justifiable when it fights substantial and clear injustice.
As Smith reminds us though, Rawls sets further restrictive conditions
to the justifiability of dissents. Namely, that the injustice has been
deliberate and existing over an extended period of time and that the
act of dissent is non-violent (Smith 2013: 38-39). Taking a deliberative
stance instead, Smith argues that civil disobedience is justifiable also
in other instances. He argues that, for example, protests that aim at
preserving a dialogue about the boundaries of justice (Smith 2013: 44)
count as justifiable dissent because they aim at preventing injustice.
Such protests are necessary because, as Smiths reminds us further, those
who hold power and can benefit from unfair legal proposals may be in
a better position to speak or disseminate their voices (Smith 2013: 57).
Therefore, justifiable dissent needs to allow for acts of protest already
in deliberative processes shaping future laws.
Critical theorists have specifically utilised the figure of Antigone
to discuss the notion of justifiable civil disobedience (Douzinas and
Warrington 1994: 189). According to Douzinas and Warrington,
Antigonean disobedience does not know whether the justice it pursues
is in fact justifiable because ‘Antigone accepts that the law – her own
and Creon’s – will take its course and will not allow her to know
whether she is pious or sinful before her terrible death’ (1994: 200).
More recently, while discussing dissent more generally and wishing
to define the boundaries of permissible dissent beyond the notion of
positive and natural law, Douzinas proposes criteria that according to
Scheuerman do not fall far from liberal theory, which Douzinas aims
to challenge. Scheuerman argues that Douzinas’ test of ’moral quality
control‘ for legitimate resistance is very similar to liberal justifications
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of dissent (2015: 439). I believe, however, that the key difference
between the Rawlsian and critical approaches to civil disobedience lie
in a radically different assessment of the fairness of the legal system in
question and the general consensus behind the existing legal norms.
While the Rawlsian model, which relies on the prolonged duration to
evidence injustice, is motivated by fundamental faith in the fairness
of legal consensus, other models express suspicion towards the legal
system and its inherent links with power. Scheuerman observes that
the legitimate resistance criterion has recently been questioned in what
he calls an anti-legal turn (2015: 441). In the anti-legal turn, criteria
like justifiability and peacefulness no longer play a role. The anti-legal
strand of civil disobedience theory sees law as oppressive and thus, in
Brownlee’s words, sees civil disobedience as ‘not just a communicative
breach, but a conscientious communicative breach of law motivated
by steadfast, sincere and serious (though possibly erroneous) moral
convictions’ (2012a: 531). Taking such a broad definition means that
the dissident’s moral commitment need not be objectively justifiable
but needs to cause a deep conflict between the dissident’s perceived
moral and ethical duties and the law.

Whether we agree that for a justifiable act of civil disobedience the
dissident’s motivations need to be objectively justifiable or whether we
take a broader approach to the issue of justifiable dissent, it is clear that
the very act of dissent results in facing the full force of the law. What
follows, becoming a dissident is a complex and difficult decision, which
Douzinas describes in the following way:
The autonomous citizen does not just obey the law; she also judges
the ‘legality’ of the law and its relationship with justice. In acts of
disobedience autonomy and existential freedom temporarily coincide.
The decision to break the law is hard, unavoidable and traumatic at
the same time (2013: 93).

This is because the punishment for dissent is always a real threat
(Douzinas 2013: 93). Whether there is a moral right not to be punished
as some would argue (Brownlee 2012b: 240), Forji reminds us that
‘protesters are not protected, given that civil disobedience typically
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involves an illegal activity. Indeed, civil disobedience is always
something that can send one to jail’ (2010: 163). The act of civil
disobedience encapsulates the incommensurability between the legally
valid law and the strong conviction that the law is morally unjust.
For purposes of exploring law through theatre, I argue that
contemporary Antigones struggling with today’s Antigonean conflicts
are characters speaking to and standing up to power and unjust laws
through words and actions. In the situation of incommensurability
between the legal norms and the call of justice, they act from the sense
of moral or ethical duty to oppose laws they consider immoral. Such
opposition may involve both speaking up to power by discussing the
laws in the making, or acting to stand up against real life consequences
of laws already in force. Contemporary Antigones take their action
knowingly and with full awareness of the possible consequences of their
civil disobedience. Their motivation is to challenge perceived injustice
and challenge the perceived failure of just governance. Such stance is
not only moral, but also political, as the action of civil disobedience
disrupts political power and challenges the validity of enacted laws.
4 Interrogating the law differently and the role of the
audience in a law and theatre play
In her book Towards a Theatrical Jurisprudence, Marett Leiboff
explores both what theatre can do for law and how theatrical
jurisprudence allows law to be theatricalised through its cases (2019:
xi). Leiboff uses Lehmann’s approach to interrogating the law through
theatre and reminds us:
that it is theatre’s role to point out what’s missing from law might
seem an impertinence for those of us deeply immersed in law and its
practices. But when we think of these most basic of theatre practices,
grounded in dramaturgy and in bringing to bear Grotowski’s
techniques in order to generate the conditions through which we
are able to notice in law, then there is nothing left of law but display
(2019: 135).
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While those of us who work with law and deal with its interpretation
can interrogate law through classical jurisprudence, using theatre
allows us to strip law of its aura of secrecy and its cloak of mysticism
and arcane knowledge accessible only to us lawyers. Theatricalising
the law can help us instead display it in its basic form to a much wider
audience reaching beyond our usual legal peers. Interrogating law
through theatre allows us to connect with the audience and encourage
each and every member to do what Douzinas (2013) described when
discussing dissent – judge its legality and relationship to justice. In her
book, Leiboff suggests using Grotowski’s techniques for interrogating
law through theatrical jurisprudence (2019: 99). Given that theatrical
jurisprudence is built on the notion of theatrical performance, the
principles Leiboff borrows from Grotowski, apply for the process of
writing a play about law, namely:
•

•

•

•
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‘Classical play text and the possibility of montage – as
excavation of law, its principles, doctrines and cases, in
particular drawing on the technique of montage that can
be drawn upon through externalities to both break into and
elucidate law as dramaturgical’ (2019: 99)

‘Confrontation and transgression – to bring myth and
archetype into the present, as a restoration of long-standing
and deep concepts lost through the technocratic, as a
restoration of injustice as ‘mirror’ rather than as times past’
(ibid)

‘Encounter and impulse – a depth of awareness of legal text
and in the humanity (and its artefacts) that produces a legal
self who works to understand the factors that trigger herself
or himself to notice, largely shaped in and beyond himself or
herself, in order to notice injustice in the law’ (ibid)
‘The holy actor – her self-sacrifice reordered within the holy
lawyer, who becomes an amalgam of spectator and actor,
uniting consciousness and instinct, and mind and body,
challenging stereotype by bringing the warm breath of
connection into law’ (ibid)
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•

‘The poor theatre – as a law that neutralises game and
strategy, as a law of response and responsibility’ (ibid)

At least four of these five points have been, perhaps intuitively, rather
than intentionally applied to interrogate the law and the Antigonean
conflict in Trumpsformation. Firstly, the play focuses on the law, its
rapid change, its processes of legitimacy and justifiability. It engages
with the newly emerging legal order, one that swiftly and mercilessly
passes new laws that openly discriminate, exclude and punish ethical
acts of support. Secondly, it brings the Antigonean conflict to the
fore through interrogating these new laws that, albeit exaggerated
for the purposes of stripping the law of its aura of mysticism, have
been mirrored on numerous similar proposals or legal developments
advocated for by populist governments across the globe. They feature
increased focus on deportations, penalisation of solidarity towards
migrants, or curtailments of the right to protest. Thirdly, it utilises
the figures of contemporary Antigones, who encounter the law and
who through processes of disagreement and eventually dissent notice
and interrogate injustices of the law. These figures mirror the act of
encounter and impulse in the process of confronting the law. Fourthly,
the Antigones challenge the myths of the law and bring them into
a present moment through dialogue and actions. Below, I analyse
how these elements were presented in Trumpsformation to inspire the
audience to interrogate the law and judge its legitimacy, regardless of
being or not being jurists.
5 Dissident speaking to power in Trumpsformation
A Who are the dissidents?

Trumpsformation is set in our contemporary reality and can take place
in any city where public servants do their work for the government and
where they are experiencing struggles with exclusion and injustice. For
the purposes of the 2018 performances, the play was set in Canberra,
in one of governmental offices working on drafts of newly proposed
legislation. Since the writing and staging of the play coincided with
early days of Trump’s presidency the title is a word play combining
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the words ‘transformation’ and ‘Trumpism’. It does not deal with
the president himself, but rather with the more insidious and longterm transformation that happens in our societies in the aftermath
of governance promoting exclusion, discrimination and curtailment
of existing legal safeguards protecting the rule of law, rights and
democracy. At a first glance, critics versed in jurisprudence may see
this premise as a simple liberal democratic defence of rights-based
consensus, akin to Rawlsian defence of civil disobedience. I would,
however, argue that for the purposes of illuminating the Antigonean
conflict, such a vivid contrast is justifiable precisely in order to bring
forward the confrontation and transgression mentioned by Leiboff
in her theory of theatrical jurisprudence. It allows jurisprudents
to bring theories and philosophical discussions about law into the
present and give new life to long-standing and deep concepts lost
in the jargonised considerations we discuss as lawyers. While the
idea of transformation of the members of society into complacent
actors complicit in perpetuating injustice is borrowed from Ionesco’s
Rhinoceros and vaguely follows a similar choice of locations – a public
café, an office and the space of the protagonist’s home – this reality is
strongly modified and focuses on contemporary Antigones’ struggles
for justice. I use the word Antigone in plural, not only to emphasise
that multiple characters can be contemporary Antigones, but also to
signify that the play has two main protagonists, Alex and April, a young
couple that met at work in the governmental office featured in the
second act of the play. The protagonists encounter several antagonists
as the plot progresses, beginning and ending with anonymous lions
– people who have fallen into the charm of populist politics. The
trope of transformation into an animal is of course borrowed directly
from Rhinoceros, where characters conform and become willing or
unwilling followers of fascism (Hayne 2008). In the contemporary
reality featured in the play, fascism was replaced by Trumpism and
rhinoceroses with lions – a symbol used by the Trump University in
their logo. While a lion can signify noble causes (Lacy 1970) it can also
stand a proxy for egotism, narcissism and self-obsession (Eyman 2008)
attributes often associated with the former United States President
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(Williams et al 2018). Despite a somewhat misleading title, this
is where the direct link to the figure of Donald Trump ends. What
concerned me as a writer was not simply critiquing a singular person,
but rather the mark the policies and laws promoted by populist leaders
leave in democratic societies. While set in Australia, multiple scholars
emphasised the significance of Trumpism as a broader phenomenon
relevant for societies outside the US (Falk 2018, Hyslop 2020), such
as the normalisation of the discourse of exclusion, silent approval of
racism, and constant testing of the boundaries of democracy and its
current foundations. The lions are thus not just followers of Trump, but
the antagonists vocally or tacitly approving broader populist agendas
and slowly, but gradually, gaining political power capable of shifting
the democratic consensus and eventually the law. Beside these primary
antagonists, the play features Tom, a colleague of Alex and April,
who vocally promotes ideas of curtailing migration and reversing
gender equality and does not hide his racist views even before lions
gain enough support to form the government. In multiple ways, the
struggle that Alex and April experience is a struggle with the end of
democracy and the fight for values and principles expounded by liberal
democratic theory; something that, as Scheuerman reminds us, we do
not always successfully transcend even as critical theorists. While I
did not see it necessary to go deeper into the problematic aspects of
democratic liberalism, I did nonetheless try to show how democratic
governance can lead to an oppressive consensus of the majority,
which can implement laws promoting exclusion, discrimination and
practices from which the majority benefits (something that differs
from Rawlsian consensus). And it is this new consensus and the new
laws promulgated in its name that the Antigones of this play decide to
challenge at the cost of paying the price of legal punishment.
The Antigonean conflict and Alex and April’s decision to become
dissidents is built slowly and culminates with the ultimate threat of
physical violence of the new law towards them. While I agree with
Brownlee that the dissidents ought to have a moral right not to be
punished (Brownlee 2021b), I believe that for the benefit of the
audience, such a threat ought to be clear and present, even if actual
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visible violence was contained to a minimum throughout the play. In
the first act, the protagonists simply struggle with the fact of a newly
emerging consensus. On the way to the café where they normally meet
or buy their morning coffee, they realised that the café implemented
a lions-only policy and, as non-lions, they were no longer welcome.
But the resistance is at this stage only expressed through anger and
defiance. When April is being harassed by a lion while waiting for Alex,
she defiantly stands up against such harassment and pretends not to be
bothered by it. At this stage, the incommensurability is only a possibility
and the resistance is only ideological, as the power relations remain
equal between the lions and the protagonists. Thus, at this point, the
exclusion from the café does not result in any further actions. However,
the situation changes rapidly throughout the second act.
B How do the play’s Antigones speak to power?

When the Lion Party forms the government, the situation changes
rapidly and both protagonists are in vivid opposition to the conforming
majority tacitly or explicitly supporting the new status quo. The power
relations shift as soon as lions form the government and laws begin
to change; rapidly involving sweeping changes to the right to privacy,
freedom of expression and migration laws. The laws introduce, amongst
other issues, mandatory surveillance of all citizens, something that
Alex scoffs at when proofing the legal draft he receives on his desk:
ALEX: [reading and correcting loudly] Everyone’s online data shall be
subject to government surveillance ... [He corrects.] surveillance with
two Ls ... they can’t even spell correctly [He corrects.] Everyone whose
online activity endangers national security or questions national
sovereignty will be subject to mandatory investigation ... sovereignty
- S-o-v-e-r-e-i-g-n-t-y ... Security officers will report to the Minister
for National Purity every online activity that aims to reveal government
secrets, such as reporting on offshore detention centers ... offshore ...
[turns to Tom] hyphen or not?

At this point the inner conflict experienced by a dissident, that
Douzinas (2013) discussed, begins. The escalation of this inner conflict
is visible to the audience in words and eventually in actions clearly
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contravening the new laws. At first, Alex and April simply begin by
openly arguing with their nowadays unashamedly lion-supporting
colleague Tom at the risk of ignoring the requirements of neutrality in
the office. While their superior Mrs. Stone does not sympathise with
the Lions, she insists on neutrality, a stance that the protagonists see
as supportive of the new injustices perpetuated in the name of what
they see as oppressive and thus unjust laws. The audience is introduced
to the drastic consequences of the new laws when Mrs. Cho enters the
office and informs the workers that Mr. Cho, a former colleague of Alex
and April, had his visa and subsequently his citizenship cancelled and
has been deported with immediate effect back to the country where
he faced death penalty for his beliefs. The revoking of the visa is a
consequence of sweeping changes aiming at ‘purifying’ the nation from
immigrants, trends reminiscent of contemporary right-wing populism
(eg Thorleifsson 2019). As the action progresses, it turns out that as a
result of new laws, Mrs. Cho’s visa is also cancelled and she is now also
a fugitive from the law. At this point, Alex and April begin active rather
than verbal opposition and decide to stand against the laws by allowing
Mrs. Cho to stay in the office after hours and hide her from law officers
who may be looking for her. Being aware of the consequences awaiting,
they consider the new laws immoral and therefore believe they have a
moral imperative to stand against them. They express their beliefs in
the following dialogue with their superior, Mrs. Stone:
ALEX: But Mrs. Stone, we cannot let them take Mrs. Cho!
MRS STONE: It is the law Alex; we cannot do anything about it.
Not anymore!
APRIL: If suffragists accepted the law as it was Mrs. Stone, neither of
us would be here. Do you know how many times Emmeline Pankhurst
got arrested before women could legally vote?
MRS STONE: Dear April, this is no time for a lecture in history. And it
hardly matters in this case anyway. These gentlemen are just doing their job.
A PR IL: I should think it does matter Mrs. Stone, the ...
MRS STONE: April, we cannot obstruct the law, we are an office of
the Parliament and you are a public servant!
APRIL: We cannot condone immoral laws Mrs. Stone, this is not right!
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ALEX: April is right, we cannot let them take Mrs. Cho,
it i s w r o n g a n d s h e h a s d o n e n o t h i n g w r o n g a t a l l !
MRS STONE: It does not matter what Mrs. Cho did or did not. We
need to let the officers do their job and enforce the law. We cannot
obstruct justice.

At this point the conflict between the contemporary Antigones’
perception of justice and the assumption that law is always just becomes
starkly illuminated.
C Legal consequences of dissent
As emphasised above, the dissident needs to accept the consequences
of their actions. The act of dissent is an action taken at a great personal
cost and speaking to power requires facing the full potential of the law.
In the play, the incommensurability of the law and ethical obligations
towards other human beings becomes stark when a new law forbidding
helping migrants comes to force. While hiding Mrs. Cho, and despite
their disbelief that law could forbid ethical conduct of helping another
human being, Alex and April decide to persevere with their resistance
despite the possibility of consequences:
ALEX: [dials several times] ... Oh my ... I can’t believe that ...
You were right ... she roared back at me telling me she will
report me for helping migrants ... how did she even know?
APRIL: [in visible despair] They need an enemy Alex, they do ... if you
don’t know whom to blame it will be migrants, then someone else when
all migrants are gone, then it will be those who dress in a wrong way,
then those who think differently ... she is just one of them now. But
what did she mean by saying she would report you? It’s not illegal to
help migrants ... surely? Tell me, I am right about that! Am I?
ALEX: [goes to his desk, clicks and scrolls, and eventually reads out loud]
Every true citizen suspected of helping any migrants shall be reported
to the Department of National Purity and the Agency for Preventing
Counter-Thought. As of today, helping any migrant, especially a
refugee or a migrant suspected of wrongdoing shall be punishable by
law and may result in imprisonment up to 5 years ...
APRIL: 5 years!? Are they mad? [Mrs. Cho starts shaking more and
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crying louder]
ALEX: [approaching the couch again] Don’t worry April, we are
doing nothing wrong. We cannot let them send Mrs. Cho to certain
death. They have already sure as hell killed her husband by sending
him there.

This incommensurability between what the Antigones see as
their ethical duty and what the new law mandates becomes vividly
illuminated when law officers find Mrs. Cho at the end of the second
act. Physically protecting Mrs. Cho from immigration officers and
barricading her with their bodies ends up in a physically violent
struggle between the officers and Alex and April. To emphasise the
conflict between the legal and the ethical, the law is presented as an
essentially oppressive force, much in the way in which Scheuerman
(2015) describes the anti-legal turn in philosophy of justifiable dissent.
It also uses Benjamin and Derrida’s ideas concerning different types
of force used by law, including the monopoly on physical violence
necessary for preservation of the law (Benjamin 1921, Derrida 1992).
While protagonists can stand against the law in their Antigonean
stand, they cannot really win against the force of the law without
consequences. In the final act, Alex and April have not only lost their
jobs but are observing the force of the law implemented by the lion
government and wonder if there is any way in which they can prevent
the new laws from becoming the new legal normal. Noticing a societal
transformation and approval for the lions, the protagonists wonder if
there is anyone else other than them that disapproves of the laws they
consider immoral and harmful. This part of the play emphasises the
loneliness of a protagonist in the Antigonean conflict. In the decision
to act, contemporary Antigones do not know whether their actions
are seen as legitimate by anyone else. Often, they stand up against
societal convention, paying not only with legal consequences but also
with societal exclusion. This loneliness of an Antigone results in Alex
and April doubting the validity of their beliefs. In this brief exchange,
they consider whether it is those who conform that are in fact right:
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APRIL: Maybe they are the happy ones. ... Maybe they are the
natural ones! Look, they look strong and content!
ALEX: We’re the ones who are doing the right thing! We are!!!
APRIL: How do you know?
ALEX: You know perfectly well that I’m right.

At the very end of the play, however, the Antigonean characters of
Trumpsformation come to terms with their actions and are willing to
pay the consequences. When lions enter the room and come to take
them to face the full force of the new law, Alex and April stand defiant,
exchanging the last lines of the dialogue:
A PR I L: We a re hu ma n bei ng s A le x . We have to f ight
this. It’s all we can do. Even if that’s the last thing we do!
ALEX: All of them! We are not surrendering!
APRIL: We will resist! We have to!

When the light goes out, the consequences of the law are left
for the audience to imagine. The act of dissent, however, becomes
complete – from the moment of ethical objection, through an act of
resistance and action challenging the law, to the moment of paying
the price first in the violent exchange with the officers and finally in
the moment of surrender.
6 Conclusions
While the conflict between the legal and the ethical in Trumpsformation
was captured in a plot mirroring Ionesco’s idea of societal
transformation, it has also captured the crucial elements of Antigone’s
stance. By illustrating the conflict between the legal and ethical, using
protagonists who do not act in the interest of their own power, but
rather in the name of ethics and protecting others from injustice, the
play utilised the notion of justifiable dissent. Furthermore, by showing
the incommensurability of the call of ethics and the demands of newly
introduced laws, it explored the notion of an Antigonean conflict and
the consequences of the law for those taking the position of an Antigone
in a fictional albeit not imaginable confrontation between the law and
the dissident. While Antigone is in itself a play that could and has been
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adapted to modern conditions (Mee and Foley 2011), the Antigonean
conflict surpasses the script of Sophocles’ play and can be a useful tool
for illustrating multiple contemporary intersections between ethics
and law, the concepts of just and unjust laws, and the situations of noncompliance and dissent. The tragic encounter between Antigone and
Creon translates to encounters between the dissident and the law that
can take place across multiple contemporary intersections – fighting
for the rights of migrants, environmental justice, worker’s rights, and
other sites of contemporary struggle for social justice. Antigone as an
archetype of a just dissenter surpasses not only her times, but also the
original script and the notions that the conflict between law and ethics
happens solely in the space of the ancient conception of the antinomy
between positive and natural law.
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